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But What if the Court Reporter Is Lying? The Right
to Confront Hidden Declarants Found in Transcripts
of Former Testimony1
Peter Nicolas2

Prior to 2004, it was fairly simple for the prosecution in a
criminal case to overcome a Confrontation Clause objection when
offering hearsay evidence against the accused. Under the United
States Supreme Court’s then-existing Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence, so long as the hearsay statement at issue fell within a
“firmly rooted”3 exception to the hearsay rule or was shown by the
prosecution
to
contain
“particularized
guarantees
of
trustworthiness,” the Confrontation Clause posed no barrier to
admissibility.4
1. Copyright © 2010 Peter Nicolas.
2. Jeffrey & Susan Brotman Professor of Law, University of Washington School of
Law. I wish to thank Professor Helen Anderson, Professor Jeffrey Fisher, Katherine Peters, and
Professor Kathryn Watts for their extremely helpful comments and assistance.
3. Whether a hearsay exception was “firmly rooted” turned on its longevity and the
extent to which it received widespread acceptance. See, e.g., Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116,
130 (1999) (relying on the fact that a particular application of the statement against interest
exception to the hearsay rule is “of quite recent vintage” to conclude that it is not firmly
rooted); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355 n.8 (1992) (using the fact that the hearsay
exception for spontaneous declarations is over two centuries old and recognized in nearly
eighty percent of the states, and the fact that the hearsay exception for statements made for
purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment is widely accepted among the states to conclude
that both are firmly rooted); Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987) (asserting
that the co-conspirator exception was firmly rooted as it was recognized by the Court 150
years earlier); Coy v. Renico, 414 F. Supp. 2d 744, 770 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (holding that
“firmly rooted” refers to hearsay exceptions that have “long-standing and widespread use”);
Capano v. State, 781 A.2d 556, 616 (Del. 2001) (noting that the finding that a hearsay
exception is firmly rooted “depends in part on the longevity and widespread acceptance of the
hearsay exception by courts and legislatures.”); State v. Ross, 919 P.2d 1080, 1089 (N.M.
1996) (“[A] court should consider the exception’s historical longevity and widespread
acceptance to determine whether the exception is ‘firmly rooted.’”).
4. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65–66 (1980). The pre-2004 approach also required
a showing that the declarant was unavailable, see id. at 68, but the U.S. Supreme Court quickly
narrowed the circumstances in which that requirement would be imposed. United States v.
Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394 (1986) (“Roberts cannot fairly be read to stand for the radical
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But in its watershed 2004 opinion in Crawford v. Washington,5
the Supreme Court re-theorized the relationship between hearsay
evidence and the Confrontation Clause and, in so doing, created a
significant barrier to offering hearsay evidence against the accused in
a criminal case. Crawford and its progeny divide hearsay into two
categories: “testimonial” and “non-testimonial.”6 If a statement is
deemed non-testimonial, then the Confrontation Clause presents no
barrier to admissibility.7 However, if the statement is testimonial, it
is, as a general rule,8 inadmissible unless the declarant is unavailable
and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine her.9
Accordingly, after Crawford, where testimonial hearsay is involved,
the prosecution can no longer overcome a Confrontation Clause
objection by merely pointing to the fact that the statement falls
within an exception to the hearsay rule, firmly rooted or otherwise.
For example, Crawford and its progeny have deemed inadmissible on
Confrontation Clause grounds testimonial statements falling within
the scope of the hearsay exceptions for statements against interest,10
excited utterances,11 and business or public records.12 Moreover, as
demonstrated by the Supreme Court’s most recent Confrontation
Clause decision in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,13 the Court has

proposition that no out-of-court statement can be introduced by the government without a
showing that the declarant is unavailable.”); Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65 n.7 (“A demonstration of
unavailability, however, is not always required.”).
5. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
6. Id. at 68.
7. Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 420 (2007); Davis. v. Washington, 547 U.S.
813, 824–25 (2006).
8. Crawford and its progeny have recognized four exceptions to this general rule. First,
the prosecution can overcome a Confrontation Clause objection to admitting a testimonial
hearsay statement if the declarant appears as a witness at trial and can be cross-examined about
the statement. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9. Second, a testimonial statement presents no
Confrontation Clause problem when offered for some reason other than to prove the truth of
the matter asserted. See id. Third, the accused can forfeit by wrongdoing his right to object on
Confrontation Clause grounds. Davis, 547 U.S. at 833; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62. See Giles v.
California, 128 S. Ct. 2678 passim (2008). Finally, dying declarations, even if testimonial, fall
within a sui generis exception to Crawford. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.6; Peter Nicolas, “I’m
Dying to Tell You What Happened”: The Admissibility of Testimonial Dying Declarations PostCrawford, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 487, 491–492 (2010).
9. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54, 59, 68.
10. See id. at 36.
11. Davis, 547 U.S. at 813–15, 820.
12. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2539–40 (2009).
13. Id. at 2540–41.
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thus far been unmoved by arguments regarding the practical
consequences of such rulings for the prosecution in terms of
requiring the production of numerous individuals to appear as
witnesses at trial.
There is, however, one hearsay exception—former testimony—
that, if applicable, satisfies the demands of the Confrontation Clause
post-Crawford and thus provides a means of admitting testimonial
hearsay statements.14 Under Crawford, testimonial statements are
admissible if the declarant is unavailable and the accused had a prior
opportunity to cross-examine her.15 Likewise, the hearsay exception
for former testimony requires that the declarant be unavailable and
that the party against whom the testimony is offered had a prior
opportunity to develop the testimony through cross-examination or
otherwise.16 Thus, because the phrase “unavailable,” as used in the
hearsay exception, is typically construed in the same way as it is used
in Confrontation Clause jurisprudence,17 former testimony falling
14. See United States v. Avants, 367 F.3d 433, 445 (5th Cir. 2004) (“The qualities that
made [the] testimony admissible under 804(b)(1) make it meet Crawford’s Confrontation
Clause test: unavailability and prior opportunity for cross-examination. In this instance,
Crawford did not alter the rule that evidence within the firmly rooted hearsay exception
expressed in Rule 804(b)(1) satisfies the Confrontation Clause.”); State v. Stephenson, 195
S.W.3d 574, 590 (Tenn. 2006) (“With respect to testimonial statements, the Court held that
‘the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior
opportunity for cross-examination.’ Thus, Crawford placed restrictions similar to Rule
804(b)(1) on the admission of testimonial statements.” (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68));
Flonnory v. State, 893 A.2d 507, 533 (Del. 2006) (describing Crawford’s requirements and
those of the state’s former testimony hearsay exception as “essentially the same”); People v.
Wilson, 114 P.3d 758, 780 (Cal. 2005) (noting that California’s former testimony hearsay
exception satisfies the requirements of Crawford).
15. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54, 59, 68.
16. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) (“The following are not excluded by the hearsay
rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness . . . . Testimony given as a witness at another
hearing of the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law
in the course of the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony is
now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity
and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination.”).
Indeed, the hearsay exception has stricter requirements than the Confrontation Clause,
requiring as well that the accused had a similar motive to develop the testimony at the earlier
proceeding. See State v. Henderson, 136 P.3d 1005, 1010 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006); David A.
Sklansky & Stephen C. Yeazell, Comparative Law Without Leaving Home: What Civil
Procedure Can Teach Criminal Procedure, and Vice Versa, 94 GEO. L.J. 683, 717 n.121
(2006).
17. The categories of unavailability recognized under the Federal Rules of Evidence
track the forms of unavailability recognized under the Confrontation Clause. Compare FED. R.
EVID. 804(a), with California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165–68 (1970), and Barber v. Page,
390 U.S. 719, 724–25 (1968). Although Green and Barber antedate Crawford, both were
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within the scope of the hearsay exception should automatically
overcome a Confrontation Clause objection, even though the former
testimony is clearly “testimonial” under Crawford.18
Yet, it is often the case that what counts as “former testimony”
for both hearsay and Confrontation Clause purposes is but one layer
in a hearsay “sandwich,” consisting of double, triple, or even
quadruple hearsay. This is because the prosecution will often attempt
to prove the person’s former testimony by means of a transcript
produced by a court reporter (adding an additional layer of hearsay)
and because the person’s former testimony may have consisted of
hearsay statements made by third persons (adding still another layer
or more of hearsay). The right to confront the person who gave
testimony in the former trial may be satisfied by demonstrating her
unavailability and the accused’s prior opportunity to cross-examine
her. However, depending on the way in which the person’s prior
testimony is proven and the content of that former testimony, there
may exist other, hidden declarants that the accused has a right to
confront.
In Part I of this Article, I will illustrate the hidden declarant issue
through a series of hypotheticals that highlight both the hearsay and
Confrontation Clause problems associated with proving former
testimony. Next, in Part II, I will demonstrate that treating the
hidden declarant’s statements as testimonial, and thus subject to
exclusion on Confrontation Clause grounds, is consistent with
Crawford and its progeny. I will then demonstrate, in Part III, that
historically, in both England and the United States, the accused had
the right to confront hidden declarants, and that the historical
exception for former testimony does not extinguish the right of the
accused to confront them. Finally, although such an interpretation of
the Confrontation Clause raises significant practical problems akin to
those raised by decisions like Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, I will
propose various practical solutions that are consistent with the
Confrontation Clause in Part IV.

cited with approval in Crawford. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 57. Moreover, lower courts
applying the definition of unavailability set forth in Federal Rule 804(a) typically will do so by
reference to Confrontation Clause precedents dealing with that issue. See, e.g., United States v.
Kehm, 799 F.2d 354, 360 (7th Cir. 1986).
18. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 (“Whatever else the term [testimonial] covers, it applies at
a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial
. . . .”).
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I. THE HIDDEN DECLARANT PROBLEM

Hearsay is defined in pertinent part as “a statement, other than
one made by the declarant19 while testifying at the trial or hearing,
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”20 In
turn, the term “statement” is defined to include “(1) an oral or
written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is
intended by the person as an assertion.”21 Hearsay is inadmissible
unless, inter alia, it falls within one of the exceptions to the hearsay
rule.22
Traditionally, there are four risks associated with hearsay
evidence, and thus four reasons why hearsay evidence is excluded:
(1) faulty perception (the risk that the declarant may have
inaccurately perceived the events at issue in her statement); (2) faulty
memory (the risk that the declarant does not accurately recall the
details of the events at issue in her statement); (3) faulty narration
(the risk that the declarant may misspeak or be misunderstood); and
(4) insincerity (the risk that the declarant is not being truthful when
she speaks).23 It is believed, for three reasons, that requiring the
declarant to appear at trial and testify first-hand to what she observed
will reduce these risks as compared with having a third party testify
to what the declarant said: (1) the declarant is under oath (and thus
to some extent more likely to speak truthfully); (2) the trier of fact is
able to observe her demeanor; and (3) she is subject to crossexamination.24
Sometimes, a hearsay statement made by one declarant contains
within it a hearsay statement made by another declarant. For

19. The term “declarant” refers to the “person who makes a statement.” FED. R. EVID.
801(b).
20. FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
21. FED. R. EVID. 801(a).
22. FED. R. EVID. 802.
23. Schering Corp. v. Pfizer Inc., 189 F.3d 218, 232 (2d Cir. 1999); State v. Sanchez,
177 P.3d 444, 472 (Mont. 2008) (Nelson, J., dissenting) (citing Schering, 189 F.3d at 232);
Stoddard v. State, 887 A.2d 564, 573 (Md. 2005); FED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory
committee’s introductory note; 4 CHRISTOPHER MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK,
FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 8:3 (3d ed. 2007); 30 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W.
GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6324 (1997); Laurence H. Tribe,
Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARV. L. REV. 957, 958 (1974); Edmund M. Morgan, Hearsay
Dangers and Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177, 185–88 (1948).
24. See FED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory committee’s introductory note; KENNETH S.
BROUN ET AL., 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 245, at 125–127 (6th ed. 2006).
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example, suppose that David is on trial, charged with murdering
Victor. The prosecution seeks to offer into evidence a police report
written by Anna, a police officer, in which she indicates that Bob
told her that he saw David shoot Victor. The police report is hearsaywithin-hearsay, or double hearsay; it is Anna’s (written) assertion
that Bob (orally) asserted that David shot Victor. The hearsay rule
requires the exclusion of hearsay-within-hearsay unless each layer of
hearsay falls within an exception to the hearsay rule.25 Thus, to
overcome a hearsay objection, not only would Anna’s written
statement have to fall within an exception to the hearsay rule, but so
too would Bob’s statement to Anna.
Moreover, each layer of hearsay is also subject to scrutiny under
the Confrontation Clause.26 Accordingly, if any layer of hearsay is
“testimonial” within the meaning of Crawford and its progeny, then
the hearsay-within-hearsay statement is subject to exclusion on
Confrontation Clause grounds unless every level of hearsay that is
testimonial satisfies the requirements of Crawford, namely, showing
that the declarant is unavailable and that the accused had a prior
opportunity to cross-examine her.27
Sometimes, a statement is offered into evidence for some reason
other than to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein. In such
instances—in which a statement is significant merely because of the
fact that it was made—it is not considered to be hearsay because it is
not being offered to prove the truth of the assertion contained
within the statement.28

25. FED. R. EVID. 805.
26. United States v. McKinney, 707 F.2d 381, 383 n.2 (9th Cir. 1983); United States
v. Mills, 446 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1136 (C.D. Cal. 2006); People v. Zapien, 846 P.2d 704, 716
(Cal. 1993); State v. Brown, 173 P.3d 612, 627 (Kan. 2007); State v. Bintz, 650 N.W.2d
913, 920 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002).
27. State v. Ennis, 158 P.3d 510, 518 (Or. Ct. App. 2007) (“Nevertheless, it seems
necessarily to follow from the United States Supreme Court’s analysis in Crawford, that the
rule of that case would apply to each level of hearsay. Consequently, the Confrontation Clause
principle enunciated in Crawford is implicated only if one or more levels of multilevel hearsay
involve both a testimonial statement and the unavailability of—and lack of prior opportunity to
cross-examine—the declarant of that statement. Conversely, it is insufficient if, for example, an
unavailable declarant makes a nontestimonial statement to another person, and that person
then makes a testimonial statement regarding the former, but is available for crossexamination. Stated another way, in order for Crawford to apply to a multilevel hearsay
statement, the two prerequisites to that application—a testimonial statement and an
unavailable declarant—must coincide on at least one level.”).
28. FED. R. EVID. 801(c) advisory committee’s note.
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For instance, in the above example, if Anna, the police officer,
testified at trial that Bob told her that he saw David shoot Victor,
that would be hearsay if offered to prove the truth of what Bob
asserted (in other words, if it was offered by the prosecution to prove
in a murder trial that David shot Victor). If, on the other hand, it
was offered to prove that Bob had the physical ability to speak, or
that he was capable of speaking English (in some case in which either
of those propositions were somehow relevant), it would then be
offered for some reason other than to prove the truth of what Bob
asserted. Accordingly, it would not be deemed hearsay.29
Similarly, the mere fact that certain words were spoken can
sometimes take on legal significance. For example, words of a
contract, defamatory statements, or perjured statements, when
offered into evidence in cases in which they are legally relevant
simply because they were made, are not hearsay.30
A statement is likewise not hearsay if offered to show its effect on
another person, such as the impact the statement had on the
person’s state of mind (e.g., his knowledge or the reasonableness of
his taking particular actions).31 For example, suppose that Anna was
married to Victor and Anna was on trial for shooting David. Anna’s
testimony that Bob told her that David shot Victor might be offered
into evidence in support of a diminished capacity defense (in other
words, her belief that David shot her husband caused her to
emotionally react in the way that she did, which, if a valid defense,
would be relevant without regard to whether David in fact shot
Victor).
In these instances—in which the statement is offered for some
reason other than to prove the truth of the matter asserted—there is
no hearsay problem as a theoretical matter because the probative
value of the evidence does not depend on the veracity of the out-ofcourt witness. Thus, there is no concern that the statement was not
made under oath, was not subject to cross-examination, and was not
said in the presence of the trier of fact. The statement is relevant
merely because it was made, without regard to whether or not the

29. United States v. Reynolds, 715 F.2d 99, 102 (3d Cir. 1983).
30. See BROUN ET AL., supra note 24, § 249, at 133; CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER &
LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 8.16, at 729–31 (3d ed. 2003).
31. See United States v. Peco, 784 F.2d 798, 804 n.3 (7th Cir. 1986); MUELLER &
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 30, § 8.18, at 732–33; BROUN ET AL., supra note 24, § 249, at
134–37.
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out-of-court declarant was speaking truthfully when she made the
statement. The only question is whether the statement was in fact
made, and that turns on the veracity of the in-court witness who is
testifying to what he allegedly heard.
Moreover, according to Crawford, when a testimonial statement
is offered by the prosecution for some reason other than to prove the
truth of the matter asserted, not only are they able to overcome a
hearsay objection, but they also overcome any objection on
Confrontation Clause grounds: “The [Confrontation] Clause . . .
does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other
than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.”32 In such
circumstances, the relevant question is whether the statement was in
fact made, and, thus, the only “witness against” the accused for
Confrontation Clause purposes—and thus the only person they have
the right to confront—is the individual recounting what the other
individual allegedly said.33
Former testimony—which includes testimony given before a
grand jury, at a preliminary hearing, in a deposition, or at a former
trial—is a form of hearsay when it is offered to prove the truth of the
matter asserted therein.34 Despite the fact that such testimony is
typically35 given under oath and the witness is subject to crossexamination, it is treated as hearsay because one of the three
advantages of live testimony—the opportunity for the jury in the
current proceeding to observe the witness’s demeanor—is absent.36

32. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004) (citing Tennessee v. Street,
471 U.S. 409, 414 (1985)).
33. Tennessee, 471 U.S. at 414 (“The Clause’s fundamental role in protecting the right
of cross-examination was satisfied by Sheriff Papantoniou’s presence on the stand. If
respondent’s counsel doubted that Peele’s confession was accurately recounted, he was free to
cross-examine the Sheriff. By cross-examination respondent’s counsel could also challenge
Sheriff Papantoniou’s testimony that he did not read from Peele’s statement and direct
respondent to say the same thing. In short, the State’s rebuttal witness against respondent was
not Peele, but Sheriff Papantoniou.”).
34. This is so even though the prior statement was made in a court proceeding. See G.
MICHAEL FENNER, THE HEARSAY RULE 13–14 (2003) (“An out-of-court statement is one
made at a time and place other than right now in this courtroom. . . . The declarant may have
made the statement in some other courtroom, in some different proceeding, but not this
courtroom during this proceeding.”).
35. In the case of grand jury testimony, the accused lacks an opportunity to crossexamine the witnesses. See United States v. Clarke, 2 F.3d 81, 83 (4th Cir. 1993).
36. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) advisory committee’s note.
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Nonetheless, if the person who testified previously is unavailable
and the person against whom the testimony is now offered had both
“an opportunity and a similar motive” to cross-examine her, then
such testimony falls within the exception to the hearsay rule for
former testimony.37 If a person who was present at the earlier
proceedings (such as a court reporter or other observer) came into
court and testified to what the now-unavailable witness said, one
would have just a single layer of hearsay (the former testimony),
which would fall within the former testimony exception to the
hearsay rule.38 One would likewise have a single layer of hearsay that
could be overcome with the former testimony exception if the
person who was present at the earlier proceeding came into court
and could not immediately recall precisely what the now-unavailable
witness said, but his memory was refreshed through the use of a
transcript or stenographic notes of the earlier proceeding.39 And,
under Crawford, such statements, despite their testimonial nature,
overcome a Confrontation Clause objection for the same reasons
that they satisfy the former testimony hearsay exception: the
declarant is unavailable and the accused had a prior opportunity to
cross-examine her.40
If either of these two methods of proving the witness’s former
testimony is used, and if the witness’s former testimony is simply a
recounting of her observations, then there exists only a single layer of
hearsay, and the above analysis suffices to overcome both the hearsay
and Confrontation Clause objections to admitting the testimony. Yet
it is often the case, either because of the method of proof, the
substance of the witness’s former testimony, or both, that what is
involved is double hearsay, triple hearsay, or some even more
complex form of multiple hearsay that requires additional analysis to

37. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).
38. See JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, 5 WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL
EVIDENCE § 804.04[2] (Joseph M. McLauglin ed., Mathew Bender 2d ed. 1997); CHARLES
T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 237, at 498–99 (1954); BROUN
ET AL., supra note 24, § 307, at 359; CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, 5
FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 8:117 (3d ed. 2007); Glen Weissenberger, Federal Rules of Evidence
804: Admissible Hearsay from an Unavailable Declarant, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 1079, 1094
(1987).
39. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 38, § 804.04[2]; MCCORMICK, supra note
38, at 499 (1954); BROUN ET AL., supra note 24, § 307, at 360 (6th ed. 2006); MUELLER &
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 38, § 8:117; Weissenberger, supra note 38, at 1094.
40. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54, 59, 68 (2004).
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overcome both hearsay and Confrontation Clause challenges to
admitting the testimony.
Although the former testimony of a witness can, as indicated
above, be proven by the testimony of someone who heard it firsthand at the earlier proceeding, it is more typically the case that it will
be proven by means of a transcript of the witness’s testimony. In
such an instance, one has hearsay-within-hearsay, with the inner layer
being the witness’s testimony in the earlier proceedings and the
outer layer being the court reporter’s written assertion as to what the
witness said.41 Furthermore, in some instances, the witness in the
earlier proceeding will have testified to a statement made by some
other person, adding yet another layer of hearsay.42 What follows is a
series of hypothetical scenarios that illustrates the layered hearsay and
Confrontation Clause problems presented by such evidence.
Consider first the hearsay and Confrontation Clause problems
raised by the outer layer of hearsay added through the use of a
transcript to prove a witness’s former testimony. As an initial
example, consider a criminal prosecution in which the defendant is
being re-tried on charges of murder after the jury in the first trial
deadlocks. The prosecution seeks to offer into evidence a transcript

41. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 38, § 8:117 (“It is easy to overlook the
fact that using a transcript to prove matters asserted in prior testimony involves two hearsay
layers, and that an exception must be found for the transcript itself.”); Weissenberger, supra
note 38, at 1093; See also Essex Ins. Co. v. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc., 282 F. App’x
406, 411–12 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that privately produced transcripts of an interview
present a “hearsay within hearsay” problem); Woods v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co., 87 So.
681, 686 (Ala. 1920); People v. Reed, 914 P.2d 184, 189 (Cal. 1996); Westernbank Puerto
Rico v. Kachkar, No. 07-1606, 2009 WL 530087, at *1 (D.P.R. Jan. 7, 2009) (Judge’s
written record of testimony presents a hearsay within hearsay problem); People v. Henry, 167
Misc. 2d 1027, 1030 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1996); State v. Silverman, Nos. 05AP-837, 05AP-838,
05AP-839, 2006 WL 2075642, at *16–17 (Ohio Ct. App. July 27, 2006); State v. Mullins,
132 Wash. App. 1027, 2006 WL 926442, at *5 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) (police transcript of
tape-recorded statement “double hearsay”); People v. Abarca, 233 Cal. App. 3d 1347, 1350–
51 (1991); In re Cary, 9 F. 754, 756–57 (S.D.N.Y. 1881).
42. See Leighty v. State, 981 So. 2d 484, 492 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (catching the
middle and inner layers but not the transcript layer); Robinson v. State, 64 P.3d 743, 749
(Wyo. 2003) (same); State v. Bintz, 650 N.W.2d 913, 918–20 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002) (same);
Moss v. Ole S. Real Estate, Inc., 933 F.2d 1300, 1311–12 (5th Cir. 1991) (same); United
States v. Groos, 616 F. Supp. 2d 777, 791 n.8 (N.D. Ill. 2008); People v. Nance, No.
227349, 2002 WL 737790, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2002); State v. Baker, 607 P.2d
61, 64 (Kan. 1980); see also Hackley v. Roudebush, 520 F.2d 108, 156 n.195 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (recognizing that a transcript of someone’s testimony presents a double or triple hearsay
problem); Evinger v. McDaniel Title Co., 726 S.W.2d 468, 474 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987)
(describing as triple hearsay a transcript containing testimony about what a third person said).
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of the testimony of a witness who is now dead but who testified in
the first trial that he saw the defendant shoot the victim. The
transcript asserts (in writing) that the witness (orally) asserted that he
saw the accused shoot the victim. Its relevancy turns on the veracity
of both the unavailable witness and the court reporter, for the
prosecution is almost certainly offering it to prove the truth of what
they collectively assert, to wit, that the accused shot the victim.
As indicated above, hearsay and Confrontation Clause concerns
regarding what the witness previously said are overcome by his
unavailability and by the fact that the accused had an opportunity
and similar motive to cross-examine the witness at the first trial. But
what of the written statement by the court reporter as to what she
allegedly heard the witness say at the first trial? Does the probative
value of the transcript not turn on the truth of what the court
reporter asserts therein, namely, that the witness in fact testified that
he saw the defendant shoot the victim?43
Thus, this is not a situation in which the court reporter’s
statement is significant merely because it was made by the court
reporter; for the purpose of determining whether or not the
defendant killed the victim, the court reporter’s statement is
significant only if the court reporter accurately recounted the alleged
eyewitness’s testimony regarding what he saw. It may be the case
that the court reporter either misheard or erred in transcribing the
witness’s testimony, or perhaps the court reporter is a bad actor who
has it out for the defendant for some reason. Indeed, all of the risks
associated with hearsay evidence are present on both levels:
When former testimony is sought to be proven by an official
transcript made at the prior proceeding . . . a problem of multiple
hearsay is presented. . . . The transcript is being offered to prove
what the reporter heard the witness state. That is the first level of
hearsay because it involves the perception, recollection, narration
and sincerity of the court reporter. If the witness’ words are also
being offered for their truth, a second level of hearsay exists
because this brings into play the perception, recollection, narration
and sincerity of the witness.44

43. Cf. Harrod v. State, 384 A.2d 753, 758 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978) (“[C]ounsel
was offering a document for its truth; he was proposing to ask the jury to accept as true the
written statement of an out-of-court declarant (the transcriber) . . . .”).
44. State v. Pinnell, 806 P.2d 110, 122 n.29 (Or. 1991).
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Accordingly, in this instance, requiring the court reporter to be
present would ensure that she could “be cross-examined . . . and the
accuracy of the witness be tested.”45
Now perhaps in a fanciful situation, one could imagine a court
reporter who is out to get a particular defendant, thus invoking the
risk of insincerity (even if the particular court reporter does not
personally know the defendant, he may have a bias against people of,
say, the same race or gender as the defendant).46 More likely, the
court reporter may have erred in reporting what a particular witness
said, either because of the risk of faulty perception or that of faulty
narration. Indeed, studies have shown that, despite their high degree
of training, the amount of human error introduced into the process
of creating a verbatim record of court proceedings through the use
of a court reporter is significant.47 In the words of one court,
“[s]tenographers are no more infallible than any other human
beings, and while, as a rule, they may be accurate, intelligent, and
honest, they are not always so . . . .”48
Perhaps a more striking example of the hearsay and
Confrontation Clause problems raised by using a transcript to prove
a witness’s testimony arises in the context of a prosecution for
perjury. In this second example, assume that the defendant is on trial
for committing perjury in an earlier proceeding, whether it is
testimony before a grand jury or at an earlier trial. The prosecution
seeks to offer into evidence a transcript of the defendant’s testimony
at the earlier proceeding. Although, at first glance, this appears to be
a hearsay-within-hearsay problem, it is not. What facially appears to
be the inner layer of hearsay (what the defendant testified to in the
earlier proceeding) is not hearsay at all, because it is not being
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted49 (indeed, the

45. See Roth v. Smith, 54 Ill. 431, 433 (Ill. 1870).
46. Although perhaps fanciful, it is not unusual for litigants to level such an accusation
at a court reporter. See, e.g., Rose v. Paterson, 152 F. App’x 589, 590 (9th Cir. 2005); United
States v. Bradshaw, No. 99-5724, 2000 WL 1434677, at *1 (6th Cir. Sept. 22, 2000);
Kuehne v. Foley, No. 3:09-cv-18, 2009 WL 1045897, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 20, 2009).
47. See In re Cary, 9 F. 754, 757 (S.D. N.Y. 1881) (“Mistakes of more or less
importance constantly occur in the notes of stenographers, even of those who are most
experienced and trustworthy . . . .”). See Keith A. Gorgos, Lost in Transcription: Why the Video
Record is Actually Verbatim, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 1057, passim (2009).
48. Brice v. Miller, 15 S.E. 272, 277 (S.C. 1892).
49. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 30, § 8.16, at 730; MCCORMICK, supra
note 38, § 230, at 481 n.11 (citing State v. Wykert, 199 N.W. 331 (Iowa 1924)).
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matter is not true, which is why the defendant is on trial for perjury).
Rather, the prior testimony was significant merely because it was
made (making a false statement under oath gives rise to legal
consequences). However, there still exists the outer layer of hearsay,
the court reporter’s assertion that the defendant so testified. That
clearly raises hearsay and Confrontation Clause concerns, does it not?
Its probative worth turns on whether it is true: if the accused did not
actually so testify, then he did not commit perjury. Accordingly,
should not the accused be able to confront the court reporter to test
the accuracy of his claim that the accused so testified?
Few courts and commentators have taken note of the outer
(transcript) layer of hearsay, but those that have addressed it have
identified two hearsay exceptions that pave the way to admitting the
testimony. First, if the court reporter appears at trial but cannot
recall what the witness testified to, the transcript can be admitted
under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(5) or its state law equivalent,
the hearsay exception for a past recollection recorded.50 Alternatively,
it can be admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8), the
hearsay exception for public records.51 Furthermore, some
jurisdictions have created specially tailored statutes to overcome the
hearsay problem raised by the transcript.52 Yet, even assuming the
hearsay objection can be overcome, there remains a viable

50. See United States v. Arias, 575 F.2d 253, 254–55 (9th Cir. 1978); State v. Pinnell,
806 P.2d 110, 122 n.29 (Or. 1991); WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 38; MCCORMICK,
supra note 38, at 499; BROUN ET AL., supra note 24, § 307, at 360.
51. See Arias, 575 F.2d at 254; Hackley v. Roudebush, 520 F.2d 108, 156 n.195 (D.C.
Cir. 1975); Pinnell, 806 P.2d at 122 n.29; People v. Reed, 914 P.2d 184, 189 (Cal. 1996);
People v. Abarca, 285 Cal. Rptr. 213, 215 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Silverman, Nos.
05AP-837, 05AP-838, 05AP-839, 2006 WL 2075642, at *16–17 (Ohio Ct. App. July 27,
2006); People v. Henry, 641 N.Y.S.2d 1003, 1003 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1996); Weissenberger,
supra note 38, at 1093 & n.74.; WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 38; MCCORMICK, supra
note 38, at 499; BROUN ET AL., supra note 24, § 307, at 360; ROGER C. PARK, TRIAL
OBJECTIONS HANDBOOK 2D § 4:84, at 210–11 (2008). A few courts hold that it is likewise
admissible under the hearsay exception for business records. See, e.g., Henry, 641 N.Y.S.2d at
1003; Pinnell, 806 P.2d at 122 n.29.
52. See PARK, supra note 51. On the federal level, where what is involved is a deposition
as opposed to a former trial, resort is often made to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 32(a)(4),
which serves as an exception to the hearsay rule for the deposition testimony of an unavailable
witness that is independent of Rule 804(b)(1). See Nationwide Life Ins. Co. v. Richards, 541
F.3d 903, 914 (9th Cir. 2008). That statute appears to encompass both layers of hearsay (the
testimony plus the transcript), since it has a provision indicating that a party waives its right to
object to errors in the transcription process if a motion to suppress is not appropriately made.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 32(d)(4).
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Confrontation Clause objection to admitting the court reporter’s
written assertion, which is examined in greater detail in Part II.
Consider next the hearsay and Confrontation Clause problems
raised by the innermost layers of hearsay that can be found in
transcripts of former testimony in which the witness in the earlier
trial testifies as to what some third person said to him. For example,
suppose that Defendant is on trial for the murder of Victim A and
the attempted murder of Victim B. At that trial, Police Officer
testifies that he arrived at the scene of the crime to find Victim A
dead of a gunshot wound and Victim B on the verge of death.
Before slipping into a coma, Victim B said to the officer, “It won’t
be long before I join Victim A in the afterworld. Be sure to tell the
judge and the jury that Defendant shot us.” The jury deadlocks, and
Defendant is re-tried on the charges. Between the first trial and the
second, Police Officer dies. The prosecution seeks to offer into
evidence a transcript of Police Officer’s testimony at the first trial.
In this example, the defense could validly raise a triple hearsay
objection to the evidence. Here, we have the court reporter’s
(written) assertion that Police Officer (orally) asserted that Victim B
asserted that Defendant shot both Victim A and Victim B, and it is
being offered to prove the truth of that assertion. The above
discussion has addressed ways of overcoming the outermost layer of
hearsay (the transcript) and the middle layer (the former testimony),
but one must still overcome hearsay and Confrontation Clause
objections to the innermost layer of hearsay: Victim B’s statement.
In this example, the most likely solution would be to invoke the
hearsay exception for dying declarations.53
Consider yet another example, in which Defendant is on trial for
statutory rape. At the first trial, Witness testifies that Victim’s
Younger Sister told him that Victim was born in 1995, making her
under eighteen years old at the time the incident occurred. The jury
is deadlocked on whether to convict, and a new trial is ordered. By
the time of the new trial, Witness has died, and the prosecution seeks
to offer into evidence a transcript of Witness’s testimony in the first
trial. In this example, the defense could validly raise a quadruple
hearsay objection to the evidence. Here, we have the court reporter’s
53. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2). It is not entirely clear that the exception would apply
in this instance, for, at common law, if A and B were shot at the same time by someone, B’s
declaration would not be admissible in a prosecution for A’s murder. See 5 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 1433, at 281–82 (Chadbourn rev. 1974).
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(written) assertion that Witness (orally) asserted that Victim’s
Younger Sister (orally) asserted that Victim was born in 1995. Why
quadruple hearsay? Because Victim’s Younger Sister is younger than
Victim, she could not have first-hand knowledge of her sister’s date
of birth, and so she probably learned of it from reputation amongst
her family members. Nonetheless, if Victim’s Younger Sister is
unavailable to testify, the hearsay exception for statements of
personal or family history could be invoked,54 and it would address
the two innermost layers of hearsay.55
So far as these innermost layers of hearsay are involved, one
might reasonably ask whether there is a valid basis for objecting to
them on hearsay and Confrontation Clause grounds. After all, if the
former testimony about these hearsay statements was admitted at the
earlier trial, then either no objection was raised, or the objection was
overcome. For two reasons, it would seem that this is no barrier to
raising the objection on retrial. First, although the authorities are to
some extent split, most hold that objections that are substantive in
nature (which would include hearsay and Confrontation Clause
objections) can be asserted for the first time on retrial.56 Moreover,
even if an objection was raised and was overcome, it may be that the
predicate facts were different at the time. For example, both the
hearsay exception for dying declarations and that for statements of
personal or family history require a showing that the declarant is
unavailable. It could be that the declarant was unavailable at the first
trial but is now available.57 For example, in the murder trial, it may

54. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(4)(B).
55. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(4)(B) advisory committee’s note.
56. See MCCORMICK, supra note 38, § 236, at 497 & n.4 (citing Aetna Ins. Co. v.
Koonce, 171 So. 269 (Ala. 1936)); BROUN ET AL., supra note 24, § 306, at 358–59 (citing
Aetna Ins. Co. v. Koonce, 171 So. 269 (Ala. 1936)). See also 1 GREENLEAF ON EVIDENCE §
163, at 234–35 (10th ed. 1860) (“But testimony thus offered is open to all the objections
which might be taken, if the witness were personally present.”); Scribner v. Palmer, 156 P.
531, 532–33 (Wash. 1916) (noting that, arguably, any objection improperly overruled in the
first trial could be raised again in the second trial); Calvert v. Coxe, 1 Gill 95, 1843 WL 3016,
at *16 (Md. 1843) (“Reasons, almost without number, may be assigned, why a party not
objecting to incompetent testimony on a first trial, should prefer his objections on the second.
His omission or waiver of his rights in a first trial, do not impair or restrain his exertion of
them in the second.”).
57. See Greiner v. Wells, 417 F.3d 305, 325–26 (2d Cir. 2005) (focusing on whether
the declarant whose statement the witness testified to at the first trial was available at the time
of the second trial).
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be that Victim B awoke from his coma between the first trial and the
second.
As the above examples demonstrate, former testimony raises
complex hearsay issues when it is proven by means of a transcript,
when it contains within it statements made by other people, or when
both factors are present. In many instances, as demonstrated above,
the hearsay objections can be overcome through resort to the many
recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule. Yet, to overcome an
objection on Confrontation Clause grounds post-Crawford, it is
insufficient that a testimonial statement falls within the scope of a
hearsay exception. Accordingly, the next part will examine the extent
to which admitting into evidence the outermost (transcript) and
innermost (statements by third persons) layers of hearsay found in
transcripts of former testimony run afoul of the Confrontation
Clause as set forth in Crawford and its progeny.
II. THE HIDDEN DECLARANT PROBLEM POST-CRAWFORD
Prior to Crawford, a handful of lower court decisions addressed
the latent Confrontation Clause problem posed by the outermost
(transcript) layer of hearsay found in transcripts of former testimony,
with some courts spotting the potential Confrontation Clause
problem and others overlooking it.
For example, in a perjury prosecution in which a transcript of the
defendant’s perjured testimony was offered into evidence, one court
held that there was no Confrontation Clause problem because it
involved the accused’s own words, as opposed to the words of
another person.58 Although the court was correct that the inner layer
of hearsay (the defendant’s former testimony) consisted of the
accused’s own words (and, thus, presented no Confrontation Clause
problem, given that the courts have held that there is no right under
the Sixth Amendment to confront one’s self),59 the court missed the
fact that the transcript represented the words of another person,

58. See Smith v. State, 259 S.W. 404, 405–06 (Ark. 1924); see also State v. Hubert, No.
99-0561, 2000 WL 1520051, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 13, 2000) (holding that there is no
problem because the person who made the statement, the accused, was in court and available
to be cross-examined concerning the statement, missing the fact that the court reporter was a
hearsay declarant too).
59. See United States v. Nazemian, 948 F.2d 522, 525–26 (9th Cir. 1991); Johnson v.
State, 832 N.E.2d 985, 999 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); State v. Torres, 121 P.3d 429, 438 (Kan.
2005); State v. Konohia, 107 P.3d 1190, 1199 n.11 (Haw. Ct. App. 2005).
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namely, the stenographer. Other lower court decisions similarly
erred, holding, for example, that no hearsay is involved (and thus
that no Confrontation Clause problem exists) because the former
testimony is not being offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted but is simply relevant because it was made.60 Those holdings
also missed the fact that the statement by the court reporter is being
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, to wit, that the
witness actually so testified at the former proceeding. In still another
decision involving a transcript of a defendant’s prior perjured
testimony, a lower court again brushed aside the Confrontation
Clause issue, using language akin to that typical of the pre-Crawford
regime:
It is thoroughly settled and familiar that there are well-known and
generally recognized exceptions to the rule grounded on
constitutional guaranty that the accused has the right to be
confronted with the witnesses against him. These exceptions find
support in and are based upon principles of public policy,
expediency, or necessity. Among the recognized exceptions that do
not contravene the constitutional provision on which the general
rule is founded, is proof of essentially documentary facts by
documentary evidence, when the original record, or an officially
authenticated copy, is made competent by statute.61

Yet, other lower court decisions recognized the lurking
Confrontation Clause problem. For example, in a case in which the
accused’s confession was taken down by a stenographer who, by the
time of trial, had died, the court held that it could not be admitted
in the absence of the stenographer without undermining the
accused’s “rights of confrontation and cross-examination.”62 And, in
a series of cases in which an effort was made to prove the defendant’s
testimony at a prior proceeding in which he (who spoke only
Chinese) testified through an interpreter, courts rejected an effort by
the prosecutor to offer into evidence the transcript of his testimony,
or even the testimony of the court reporter alone. The courts held
that it was necessary to bring the interpreter into court, since that
60. See United States v. Giles, 58 M.J. 634, 638–39 (N.M. Ct. Crim. App. 2003);
Commonwealth. v. Weitkamp, 386 A.2d 1014, 1025–26 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978). The
Weitkamp case can be distinguished on the ground that in that case, witnesses from the first
trial appeared and confirmed the accuracy of the transcript. See id. at 1026.
61. Todd v. State, 69 So. 325, 327 (Ala. Ct. App. 1915).
62. State v. Harding, 165 N.W.2d 723, 729 (Neb. 1969).
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was the only person who actually knew what the defendant said.63 In
still another early case, a statute deemed admissible a transcript of a
stenographer’s notes without the need to produce the stenographer.
However, the court, citing the Confrontation Clause, held that the
statute could not be invoked against the accused in a criminal case:
[T]he defendant in a criminal cause is entitled to be confronted by
the witnesses who testify against him . . . . Hence, when questions
arise like the one now under consideration, where it becomes
necessary to prove what the testimony of the accused was in
another trial, to which he was not a party, this statute does not
control; and the stenographer who took the testimony may be
sworn as a witness, and after testifying to the fact that he took the
testimony at the time it was given, that he correctly recorded it in
shorthand, and that he has correctly transcribed the same into
longhand, may read the testimony from either the shorthand notes
or the longhand manuscript, and he will be subject to crossexamination as to the correctness of his notes, the accuracy of his
system of stenography, the identity of party, and as to the matter
contained in the notes or manuscript, as well as any other facts
relating to the matter testified to by him.64

In any event, post-Crawford, the focus is on whether the
statement is “testimonial” or not. Thus, layered hearsay presents a
Confrontation Clause problem if one or more of the layers is
“testimonial” and the declarant for that layer of hearsay is not
present at trial to be confronted and the statement does not fall
within one of the Crawford exceptions (e.g., unavailability and prior
opportunity for cross-examination).65 Therefore, one must consider
whether the statements by the hidden declarants in the examples set

63. See People v. Lee Ah Yute, 60 Cal. 95, 96 (1882); People v. Lee Fat, 54 Cal. 527,
531 (1880).
64. See Cutter v. Territory, 56 P. 861, 863 (Okla. 1899).
65. See State v. Ennis, 158 P.3d 510, 518 (Or. Ct. App. 2007) (“Nevertheless, it seems
necessarily to follow from the United States Supreme Court’s analysis in Crawford, that the
rule of that case would apply to each level of hearsay. Consequently, the Confrontation Clause
principle enunciated in Crawford is implicated only if one or more levels of multilevel hearsay
involve both a testimonial statement and the unavailability of—and lack of prior opportunity to
cross-examine—the declarant of that statement. Conversely, it is insufficient if, for example, an
unavailable declarant makes a nontestimonial statement to another person, and that person
then makes a testimonial statement regarding the former, but is available for crossexamination. Stated another way, in order for Crawford to apply to a multilevel hearsay
statement, the two prerequisites to that application—a testimonial statement and an
unavailable declarant—must coincide on at least one level.”).
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forth above are “testimonial” within the meaning of Crawford, and,
if so, whether they fall within an express or implied exception to the
command of the Confrontation Clause as construed in Crawford and
its progeny.
In Crawford, the Court identified but did not specifically
endorse any one formulation of the “core class” of “testimonial”
statements: (1) “ex parte in-court testimony or its functional
equivalent—that is, material such as affidavits, custodial
examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to
cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would
reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially”;66 (2) “extrajudicial
statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as
affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions”;67 and (3)
“statements that were made under circumstances which would lead
an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would
be available for use at a later trial.”68 The Crawford Court, while
“leav[ing] for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive
definition of ‘testimonial,’”69 concluded that it applies, at the very
least, to “prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand
jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations.”70
Crawford thus makes clear that the middle layer of our hearsay
“sandwich”—the prior testimony itself—is “testimonial.” But what
about the outer layer, the court reporter’s written statement—in the
form of a transcript—regarding what the witness allegedly testified
to? Is that written statement “testimonial” under Crawford? This
requires a closer look at not only the language used in Crawford to
define the term “testimonial,” but also the Court’s discussion of that
issue in two post-Crawford decisions.
First, in Davis v. Washington,71 the Court distinguished between
testimonial and non-testimonial statements in the context of police
interrogations as follows:

66. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (quoting Brief for Petitioner at
23).
67. Id. at 52–53 (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992)).
68. Id. at 52 (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., joined
by Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
69. Id. at 68.
70. Id.
71. 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
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Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance
to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing
emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution.72

The Davis court went on to note that statements made under
official interrogation are testimonial when they “are an obvious
substitute for live testimony” in that “they do precisely what a
witness does on direct examination.”73
The Court built on this definition in its most recent decision,
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts.74 In that case, the defendant was
charged with trafficking in cocaine in an amount between 14 and 28
grams.75 At trial, the prosecution offered into evidence certificates of
analysis from state forensic analysts indicating the weight of the
substance found on the accused’s person as well as a statement
indicating that the substance was tested and was found to contain
cocaine.76
The Melendez-Diaz Court held that the certificates of analysis fell
within the “core class of testimonial statements” described in
Crawford.77 The Court viewed the certificates as “functionally
identical to live, in-court testimony,”78 and deemed them testimonial
because, as in Davis, the statements made in the certificates do
“precisely what a witness does on direct examination.”79 The Court
further noted that the statements were “made under circumstances
which would lead an objective witness to reasonably believe that the
statement would be available for use at a later trial,”80 and said that it

72. Id. at 822.
73. Id. at 830 (emphasis omitted).
74. 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
75. Id. at 2530.
76. Id. at 2531.
77. Id. at 2532 (quoting City of Littleton, Colo. v. Z.J. Gifts, D-4, L.L.C., 541 U.S.
36, 51 (2004)).
78. Id.
79. Id. (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 830 (2006)).
80. Id. (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004)).
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was safe to assume that the analysts were aware of that evidentiary
purpose, since it was reprinted on the affidavits themselves.81
In Melendez-Diaz, the Court rejected an effort to limit the scope
of the Confrontation Clause to so-called “conventional,” “typical,”
or “ordinary” witnesses.82 The Court thus held it irrelevant that the
analysts “observe[d] neither the crime nor any human action related
to it.”83 The Melendez-Diaz Court also rejected an effort to
distinguish “between testimony recounting historical events, which is
‘prone to distortion or manipulation,’” and the testimony at issue in
the case, which was the “resul[t] of neutral, scientific testing.”84 The
Court disputed the characterization of forensic testing as “neutral
scientific testing,” noting that it was not immune to the risk of
manipulation by a fraudulent analyst.85 The Court noted that “[l]ike
the eyewitness who has fabricated his account to the police, the
analyst who provides false results may, under oath in open court,
reconsider his false testimony. And, of course, the prospect of
confrontation will deter fraudulent analysis in the first place.”86
Moreover, the Court pointed out that the purpose of Confrontation
is “to weed out not only the fraudulent analyst, but the incompetent
one as well.”87 The Court noted that cross-examination would
permit the defendant to explore any weaknesses in the analyst’s
training or judgment.88
The Melendez-Diaz Court then turned to the State’s contention
that the affidavits should be admissible because they are “akin to the
types of official and business records admissible at common law.”89
The Court explained that, after Crawford, the fact that something
falls within a particular category of hearsay does not exempt it from
Confrontation Clause analysis; what matters is whether it is
testimonial or not:
Respondent also misunderstands the relationship between the
business-and-official-records
hearsay
exceptions
and
the

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id. at 2534.
Id. at 2535.
Id. at 2536 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 29).
Id. at 2536–37.
Id. at 2537.
Id.
Id. at 2537–38.
Id. at 2538.
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Confrontation Clause. As we stated in Crawford: “Most of the
hearsay exceptions covered statements that by their nature were not
testimonial—for example, business records or statements in
furtherance of a conspiracy.” Business and public records are
generally admissible absent confrontation not because they qualify
under an exception to the hearsay rules, but because—having been
created for the administration of an entity’s affairs and not for the
purpose of establishing or proving some fact at trial—they are not
testimonial. Whether or not they qualify as business or official
records, the analysts’ statements here—prepared specifically for use
at petitioner’s trial—were testimony against petitioner, and the
analysts were subject to confrontation under the Sixth
Amendment.90

It is worth pausing here for a moment to consider the application
of Crawford, Davis, and Melendez-Diaz to transcripts of former
testimony produced by court reporters or stenographers. Is it not
likely that court reporters know, or reasonably should know, that the
transcripts they are producing are likely “to be used prosecutorially”
or that they will “be available for use at a later trial”? The answer to
this question may vary depending on the type of proceeding that is
being transcribed. On one end of the spectrum is a deposition of a
witness who is known with certainty to be unavailable to testify at
trial. In this situation, the court reporter’s primary purpose in
creating the transcript is for use at a later trial. On the other end of
the spectrum is a transcript of trial testimony. While such a transcript
may be used in a future trial (if, for example, the jury deadlocks or
the conviction is overturned on appeal and a new trial is ordered),
the primary purpose for creating the transcript is likely to preserve a
record for appellate review. In between those two extremes are
various other circumstances in which creating a transcript may serve
multiple purposes. Accordingly, in deciding whether the court
reporter’s statement is testimonial or not, one might, as in Davis, ask
what the court reporter’s primary purpose was in making the
transcript, deeming testimonial only those situations in which
circumstances objectively indicate that the primary purpose in
creating the transcript was for use at a future trial.91
Assuming that the court reporter’s primary purpose in creating
the transcript was for use at a future trial, other statements by the
90. Id. at 2539–40 (citations omitted).
91. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 830 (2006).
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Court in Melendez-Diaz and Davis suggest that the transcripts
should be deemed testimonial. First, that the court reporter did not
actually witness the crime itself is irrelevant under Melendez-Diaz,
which eschews any effort to limit the definition of “witnesses” to
those who observed the crime itself or any human action related to it
(furthermore, when the crime charged is perjury at a former trial or
proceeding, they actually did observe the crime itself). Moreover,
court reporters are no less prone to dishonesty or incompetency than
forensic analysts, traits that, the Melendez-Diaz Court notes, can be
explored on cross-examination. Furthermore, since, in the absence of
admitting the transcripts, the court reporters themselves would come
into court and testify to what the witness said at the former
proceeding, is not the transcript—in the words of the Davis Court—
“an obvious substitute for live testimony” that does “precisely what a
witness does on direct examination”?92 Finally, although the
transcript layer of former testimony—like the certificates of the
forensic analysts at issue in Melendez-Diaz—is typically admissible as
a business or official record, that does not, as Melendez-Diaz teaches,
exempt it from scrutiny under the Confrontation Clause to the
extent that it is testimonial.
Before concluding that the Crawford-Davis-Melendez-Diaz line
of cases compels a conclusion that transcripts or stenographic notes
admitted without calling the court reporter as a witness presents a
Confrontation Clause problem, it is worth considering one wrinkle
raised by the Melendez-Diaz dissent, coupled with the majority’s
response.
The Melendez-Diaz dissent identified a line of lower court cases
and a prior U.S. Supreme Court decision that it believed compelled a
different outcome in the case. The line of cases involved what the
dissent referred to as a “copyist,” that is, a government official who,
for original records that could not be taken from the archive, would
create by hand a copy of the same for use at trial. Drawing an
analogy to the issue before the Court, the dissent wrote:
In that case, the copyist’s honesty and diligence are just as
important as the analyst’s here. If the copyist falsifies a copy, or
even misspells a name or transposes a date, those flaws could lead
the jury to convict. Because so much depends on his or her honesty

92. See id.
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and diligence, the copyist often prepares an affidavit certifying that
the copy is true and accurate.
Such a certificate is beyond question a testimonial statement under
the Court’s definition: It is a formal out-of-court statement offered
for the truth of two matters (the copyist’s honesty and the copy’s
accuracy), and it is prepared for a criminal prosecution.
During the Framers’ era copyists’ affidavits were accepted without
hesitation by American courts.93

The majority described this historical exception as “narrowly
circumscribed.”94 According to the majority, this line of cases
permitted a clerk to certify the correctness of a copy of a record kept
in his office but gave him no authority to furnish, as evidence for
trial, his interpretation of what the record contained or showed, or
to certify to its substance or effect.95 In the Court’s view, there was a
distinction between authenticating or providing a copy of an
otherwise admissible record and creating a record for the purpose of
providing evidence against a defendant.96 The dissent rightly pointed
out that, in any event, drawing such fine distinctions was not
consistent with the majority’s otherwise stated view that the focus is
on whether the evidence is testimonial rather than the category into
which it falls.97
To be sure, there may have been a more persuasive way for the
majority to reject the authorities cited by the dissent. The only
federal case cited by the dissent was a civil, not a criminal,
proceeding, and therefore the Confrontation Clause would not have
been applicable.98 And, although the dissent cited criminal cases,
those were decisions from the 1870s that were decided in state
courts,99 and the Supreme Court did not hold the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment applicable to the states until
1965.100

93. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2553 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 2539 (majority opinion).
95. See id. at 2538–39.
96. Id. at 2539.
97. Id. at 2553 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
98. See id. (citing United States v. Percheman, 7 Pet. 51, 85 (1833)).
99. See id. (citing Williams v. State, 54 Ala. 131, 134–35 (1875); State v. Potter, 52 Vt.
33, 38 (1879)).
100. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
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In any event, even accepting this historical exception, the
majority did describe it as “narrowly circumscribed.” On the one
hand, one could draw an analogy between the copyist and the
transcriber: just as the copyist makes a physical copy of another
written document and certifies to its correctness, so a stenographer
makes a written copy of someone’s oral statements. Indeed, one case
cited by the majority describes a copy as “a transcript of the
original.”101 On the other hand, this section of the majority’s
opinion is mere dicta, and the dissent’s points about why this should
be treated no differently under Crawford are far more compelling
than the majority’s effort to distinguish it. Nonetheless, even
accepting the dicta, given that the Court justifies this exception on
historical grounds, the answer to whether transcripts or stenographic
notes should be similarly treated turns on whether a historical
exception existed for them, a topic taken up in Part III.
The dissent also cited the Court’s prior opinion in Dowdell v.
United States.102 In that case, the Court rejected a Confrontation
Clause objection to a trial judge, trial court clerk, and court reporter
certifying to the appellate court that the defendants were arraigned,
whether they pleaded guilty or not guilty, and whether they were
present during the trial.103 While the dissent tried to argue that this
case allowed for the admission of a testimonial certification by the
officials,104 the majority explained that they “were not witnesses for
purposes of the Confrontation Clause because their statements
concerned only the conduct of defendants’ prior trial, not any facts
regarding defendants’ guilt or innocence.”105 For this reason, the
Court had previously, in Davis v. Washington, deemed the evidence
at issue in Dowdell to be non-testimonial.106
Dowdell—as construed by Davis and Melendez-Diaz—is thus for
two different reasons inapplicable to the situation in which a
transcript or stenographic notes of former testimony is offered into
evidence at a subsequent trial. First, while the certification by the
101. State v. Champion, 21 S.E. 700, 701 (N.C. 1895).
102. 221 U.S. 325 (1911).
103. Id. at 326–31.
104. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2553.
105. Id. at 2539 n.8.
106. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 825 (2006) (“[F]acts regarding conduct of
prior trial certified to by the judge, the clerk of court, and the official reporter did not relate to
defendants’ guilt or innocence and hence were not statements of ‘witnesses’ under the
Confrontation Clause.”).
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court reporter and other officials in Dowdell involved only a
statement regarding the defendants’ conduct at trial, the information
contained in transcripts of former testimony will typically go directly
to the defendant’s guilt or innocence. Indeed, it is because it goes to
the defendant’s guilt or innocence that it is typically offered into
evidence by the prosecution. Second—and perhaps more
importantly—while the statement contained in a transcript or
stenographic notes of former testimony is made to a jury (or, in a
bench trial, to a judge) who is using that information to make a
determination regarding the accused’s guilt or innocence, the
statement at issue in Dowdell was not made to a trier of fact who was
determining the accused’s guilt or innocence but was instead being
made to an appellate court whose task is not to determine guilt or
innocence but whose only function—in the words of the Dowdell
Court “is to determine whether there is error in the record, to the
prejudice of the accused.”107
The Melendez-Diaz majority then turned to what it described as
a “[f]ar more probative” line of cases, those “in which the
prosecution sought to admit into evidence a clerk’s certificate
attesting to the fact that the clerk had searched for a particular record
and failed to find it.”108 The majority then used the logic of these
cases to refute any notion that there was an official records exception
to the Confrontation Clause:
Like the testimony of the analysts in this case, the clerk’s statement
would serve as substantive evidence against the defendant whose
guilt depended on the nonexistence of the record for which the
clerk searched. Although the clerk’s certificate would qualify as an
official record under respondent’s definition—it was prepared by a
public officer in the regular course of his official duties—and
although the clerk was certainly not a “conventional witness” under
the dissent’s approach, the clerk was nonetheless subject to
confrontation.109

Typically, the sort of evidence at issue in this line of cases cited
by the Melendez-Diaz majority has been offered and admitted
107. See Dowdell, 221 U.S. at 331. Indeed, it is because of this limited function of
appellate courts that the Dowdell court held that the accused’s due process right to be present
at every stage of the trial does not encompass a right to be present in appellate proceedings
related to that trial. See id.
108. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2539.
109. Id.

1174

DO NOT DELETE

1149

12/14/2010 2:10:40 PM

But What if the Court Reporter Is Lying?

pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 803(10) (or its state law
analogues), which creates an exception to the hearsay rule under the
following circumstances:
To prove the absence of a record, report, statement, or data
compilation, in any form, or the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of
a matter of which a record, report, statement, or data compilation,
in any form, was regularly made and preserved by a public office or
agency, evidence in the form of a certification in accordance with
rule 902, or testimony, that diligent search failed to disclose the
record, report, statement, or data compilation, or entry.110

To get a sense of Melendez-Diaz’s sweeping nature, it is worth
noting that, prior to the decision, lower courts were virtually
unanimous in concluding that such certificates of non-existence of
records were still admissible post-Crawford.111 After Melendez-Diaz,
of course, lower courts have held (or prosecutors have conceded)
that they are testimonial.112 In any event, the key point to get out of
this part of Melendez-Diaz is this: if the Court is unwilling to create
an exception for a simple statement by an official that a records
search failed to turn up a particular document—in the belief that the
statement is testimonial and that cross-examination might either
expose the declarant’s dishonesty or incompetence in searching for
the document—then surely a detailed statement in the form of a
transcript indicating everything that a witness said at a prior trial is
no less testimonial and would benefit no less from crossexamination. Thus, unless, as a historical matter, the exception to the
Confrontation Clause for the inner layer of hearsay—the former
cross-examined testimony of an unavailable declarant—encompassed
an exception for the outer layer of hearsay—the transcript—then the
Court’s recent Confrontation Clause decisions appear to compel the
conclusion that the outer layer of hearsay involved in transcripts of
former testimony will at least in some circumstances be deemed
110. FED. R. EVID. 803(10).
111. See, e.g., United States v. Urqhart, 469 F.3d 745, 748–49 (8th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Cervantes-Flores, 421 F.3d 825, 830–34 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. RuedaRivera, 396 F.3d 678, 680 (5th Cir. 2005); State v. Kirkpatrick, 161 P.3d 990, 994–98
(Wash. 2007). But see United States v. Earle, 488 F.3d 537, 545 (1st Cir. 2007) (suggesting
that they may be inadmissible post-Crawford but deciding the case on other grounds); United
States v. Salinas-Valenciano, 220 F. App’x 879, 883–85 (10th Cir. 2007) (same).
112. See United States v. Madarikan, No. 08-5589-CR, 2009 WL 4826912, at *2 & n.3
(2d Cir. Dec. 16, 2009); Tabaka v. District of Columbia, 976 A.2d 173, 175 (D.C. 2009);
Washington v. State, 18 So. 3d 1221, 1224–25, 1224 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
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testimonial. Consequently, the transcript cannot be offered in lieu of
the court reporter’s live presence at the subsequent trial in which the
former testimony is being offered into evidence.
To be sure, one might contend that an interpretation of the
Confrontation Clause that prefers the testimony of the court
reporter (who is unlikely to have a clear recollection of what the
witness testified to) over a transcript or stenographic notes that she
produced contemporaneously with the testimony itself is foolhardy.
After all, one policy rationale advanced in favor of holding that the
hearsay rule should not keep out transcripts or stenographic notes is
a belief that they, being written contemporaneously with the
testimony given, are more reliable than having witnesses testify from
their own memory.113 Yet, although this may be sound so far as
hearsay analysis is concerned, it is not a reason to interpret the
Confrontation Clause to permit the transcript or stenographic notes
to be introduced in the absence of the stenographer’s presence. After
all, as Crawford stresses in rejecting the Roberts test (which used
reliability as the touchstone):
To be sure, the [Confrontation] Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure
reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a
substantive guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be reliable,
but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in
the crucible of cross-examination. . . . Where testimonial statements
are at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy
constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually
prescribes: confrontation.114

Of course, if the court reporter appears at trial but cannot
remember what the witness testified to, and the transcript is
admitted as a past recollection recorded, the Confrontation Clause
problem disappears. As Crawford emphasizes, “when the declarant
appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause
places no constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial
statements.”115 Because the hearsay exception for a past recollection
recorded requires that the declarant appear at trial and testify to a
lack of memory, she is subject to cross-examination within the

113. See Cutter v. Territory, 56 P. 861 (Okla. 1899).
114. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61, 68–69 (2004).
115. Id. at 59 n.9.
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meaning of Crawford.116 And, under established Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence, it suffices that the person appears at trial and
willingly responds to questions; her inability to provide detailed
responses due to a lack of memory does not create a problem.117
Thus, admitting the transcript as a past recollection recorded has the
virtue of getting before the trier of fact what is likely a more accurate
memorialization of the former testimony while at the same time
allowing the accused to confront the court reporter to explore bias,
incompetence, or the like.
Before turning to the question whether a historical exception
exists so far as the outermost (transcript) layer is concerned, it is
worth considering for a moment the innermost layers of hearsay in
situations in which a transcript reports testimony by a witness that in
turn refers to hearsay statements by third persons. Whether an
additional Confrontation Clause problem is posed by these
innermost layers of hearsay turns on whether the specific statements
by the third persons are testimonial, and, if so, whether they fall
within any exceptions identified in Crawford or its progeny.
Consider first the example in which Defendant is being re-tried
for the murder of Victim A and the attempted murder of Victim B,
and the prosecution offers into evidence the transcript of Police
Officer’s testimony that Victim B said, “Be sure to tell the judge and
the jury that Defendant shot us.” The innermost layer of hearsay
could not be more testimonial: the victim is telling a police officer to
tell the judge and jury what happened. Thus, without question, it is
something that Victim B would either “reasonably expect to be used
prosecutorially” or that “would lead an objective witness reasonably
to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later
trial.”118
Yet, because Crawford suggests, at least in dicta, that dying
declarations (even if testimonial) fall within a historical exception to
the Confrontation Clause,119 the innermost layer of hearsay in this
116. See United States v. Garcia, 282 F. App’x 14, 23–24 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding no
Confrontation Clause problem where the exception for recorded recollections is invoked
because of the declarant’s presence at trial); Abeny v. Commonwealth, 657 S.E.2d 796, 802–
03 (Va. 2008); State v. Gorman, 854 A.2d 1164, 1175–78 (Me. 2004).
117. See also United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 564 (1988) (explaining that
Confrontation Clause satisfied even if declarant appears at trial but cannot recall what
happened).
118. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51–52.
119. See id. at 56 n.6.
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example may or may not present an additional Confrontation Clause
problem. The determining factors include whether the historical
exception applies if the declarant does not actually die and whether
or not Victim B awakes from the coma (in which case he may no
longer be “unavailable”).120
The innermost layers of hearsay in the second example—
involving statements among and by family members regarding
Victim’s age offered in a statutory rape prosecution—would clearly
be non-testimonial. Not only is there no reason to believe that the
statements were made under circumstances in which one would
expect them to be used prosecutorially, but the Supreme Court has
also suggested, post-Crawford, that statements made to friends,
family members, neighbors, and other non-government actors or
agents are, by definition, non-testimonial.121
III. HISTORICAL PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND
Although unofficial court reporters have been in existence since
the time of Socrates and in the United States since its inception,
officially appointed court reporters responsible for creating verbatim
transcripts of judicial proceedings did not appear in the United States
until the late nineteenth century.122 Indeed, until 1944, they did not
exist in the federal court system.123
An examination of judicial decisions in the United States
demonstrates that the practice of permitting a transcript or
stenographic notes to be introduced without the court reporter’s
presence was foreign to the common law and is of relatively recent
vintage. When first confronted with this question, most courts
identified only one appropriate method of proving witness testimony
at an earlier trial: testimony from someone who was present at the
earlier trial and could remember what the witness testified to.124 As
120. See Peter Nicolas, “I’m Dying to Tell You What Happened”: The Admissibility of
Testimonial Dying Declarations Post-Crawford, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 487 (2010).
121. See Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2692–93 (2008).
122. See Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 433 (1993) (citing Oswald
M.T. Ratteray, Verbatim Reporting Comes of Age, 56 JUDICATURE 368, 368–69 (1973));
Gonzalez v. State, 878 A.2d 604, 609 n.4 (Md. 2005); Oswald M.T. Ratteray, Verbatim
Reporting Comes of Age, 56 JUDICATURE 368 (1973).
123. Antoine, 508 U.S. at 433.
124. See, e.g., Wilmoth v. Wheaton, 105 P. 39, 39 (Kan. 1909) (“Prior to the [use of
court stenographers], the only method of securing the evidence which had once been given in
court by a witness, afterward deceased, was to call witnesses who had been present and heard
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the use of stenographers to create verbatim transcripts evolved in the
United States, courts began to hold that the stenographic notes or
transcripts created by them were not themselves evidence admissible
at the subsequent trial, but could only be used to refresh the
memory of a stenographer who appeared on the stand at the
subsequent trial to testify to what the witness testified to at the
earlier proceedings.125
Over time, courts started to loosen this restriction, permitting
the stenographic notes or transcript (or notes of a non-stenographer
witness) to be admitted under the hearsay exception for past
recollections recorded when the stenographer (or other person
present at the first trial) appeared at the subsequent trial and could
not remember what the witness testified to, even with the aid of their
notes or the transcript.126 Courts felt comfortable with so broadening
the method of proving former testimony because, with the
stenographer or court reporter on the stand, the “right to crossexamine the reporter . . . was preserved.”127 But in no instance did
these early decisions permit proof of the witness’s testimony in the
absence of a person who was present at the first trial appearing as a
witness at the subsequent trial.128 Only in the twentieth century was
there widespread acceptance of the practice of admitting the
stenographic notes or transcript without requiring the stenographer
to appear at trial, and typically only as a result of a statutory

his testimony . . . .”); Ecker v. McAllister, 54 Md. 362, 371–72 (1880) (“The only proper
mode of proving what a witness orally testified to on a former trial is to examine witnesses for
that purpose who heard his evidence given.”).
125. See Sneierson v. United States, 264 F. 268, 275 (4th Cir. 1920); McColgan v.
Noble, 29 S.W.2d 205, 206–07 (Mo. Ct. App. 1930); Wilmoth, 105 P. at 39–40; Wright v.
Wright, 50 P. 444, 445–46 (Kan. 1897).
126. See Ruch v. City of Rock Island, 97 U.S. 693, 694–95 (1878); Lueders v. United
States, 210 F. 419, 425 (9th Cir. 1914); United States v. Wood, 28 F. Cas. 754, 754–55
(E.D. Penn. 1818); Wright, 50 P. at 445–46; Hair v. State, 21 N.W. 464, 466–67 (Neb.
1884).
127. See Hair, 21 N.W. at 467.
128. See Chi., St. Paul, M. & O. Ry. Co. v. Myers, 80 F. 361, 365 (8th Cir. 1897)
(holding stenographic report admissible to prove prior testimony “provided, always, that the
stenographic report of his testimony is proven to the satisfaction of the trial court to be
correct, by the person by whom it was reported”); Eads v. State, 170 S.W. 145, 146 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1914) (“It appears that what is termed a stenographer’s report of the evidence of
the witnesses was introduced, but the stenographer who took the testimony did not testify in
the case, and no person testified that this in fact was the testimony of the gentlemen named.
Some proof should have been made that this was in fact their testimony on the former trial
before the evidence should have been admitted.”).
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enactment providing for their admissibility.129 Indeed, although
Wigmore endorsed the practice “on principle,” he noted that courts
as a general rule declined to permit it in the absence of statutory
authorization.130
A series of Maryland cases is representative of the development
over time in the United States of methods of proving former
testimony. The first published Maryland decision to address the issue
was decided in 1880 and held that “[t]he only proper mode of
proving what a witness orally testified to on a former trial is to
examine witnesses for that purpose who heard his evidence given.”131
By the twentieth century, Maryland decisions held it permissible for
the stenographer to use his stenographic notes to refresh his memory
or, if he could not remember, to offer the stenographic notes or
transcript under the hearsay exception for past recollection
recorded.132 Yet despite this broadening, one thing was clear in
Maryland, even as late as 2005: “only the notes or transcript
prepared by a person actually present and in a position to hear the
testimony may be used, and then only when authenticated or verified
by a live witness subject to cross-examination.”133
Moreover, the earliest U.S. Supreme Court decision addressing
the admissibility of former testimony in the face of a Confrontation
Clause claim recognized the hearsay-within-hearsay nature of using a
transcript or stenographic notes to prove the former testimony, and
also appeared to contemplate the presence of the stenographer at
trial. In Mattox v. United States,134 the U.S. Supreme Court, after

129. See, e.g., Wilmoth, 105 P. at 39–40. See generally 5 WIGMORE, supra note 53, §
1669, at 786.
130. 5 WIGMORE, supra note 53, § 1669, at 786.
131. Ecker v. McAllister, 54 Md. 362, 371–72 (1880); accord Herrick v. Swomley, 56
Md. 439 (1881); see also Gonzalez v. State, 878 A.2d 604, 608 (Md. 2005) (discussing Ecker
and Herrick); Harrod v. State, 384 A.2d 753, 759 (Md. 1978) (same).
132. See Snyder v. Cearfoss, 57 A.2d 786 (Md. 1948); Holler v. Miller, 9 A.2d 250,
251–52 (Md. 1939); Mayor and City Council of Balt. v. State, 103 A. 426, 428 (Md. 1918);
see also Gonzalez, 878 A.2d at 609–10 (discussing these cases); Harrod, 384 A.2d at 759–60
(same).
133. Harrod, 384 A.2d at 759 (emphasis added); see also Gonzalez, 878 A.2d at 610–11
(citing Harrod and noting that the only methods recognized under Maryland law are firsthand
testimony from unaided memory by an observer at the earlier trial, use of stenographic notes or
a transcript to refresh the memory of an observer at the earlier trial (including a court
reporter), or admitting the notes as a past recollection recorded).
134. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
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holding that admitting the former testimony of an unavailable
witness does not violate the Confrontation Clause, went on to state:
We do not wish to be understood as expressing an opinion upon
this point, but all the authorities hold that a copy of the
stenographic report of his entire former testimony, supported by
the oath of the stenographer that it is a correct transcript of his
notes and of the testimony of the deceased witness,—such as was
produced in this case,—is competent evidence of what he said.135

Although these nineteenth and early twentieth century U.S.
precedents are telling, in Crawford and its progeny, the Court’s
prime source for determining the meaning of the Confrontation
Clause has been the common law extant in England in 1791, the
year in which the Sixth Amendment was ratified.136
As indicated above, in Crawford, the Supreme Court identified
one of the few instances in which, historically, a testimonial hearsay
statement of a declarant who did not appear at trial was admissible:
when the declarant is “unavailable to testify and the defendant had
had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”137 In support of its
conclusion, the Court examined English practice under the Marian
bail and committal statutes.138 The Marian committal statute
required Justices of the Peace to examine suspects and witnesses139 in

135. Id. at 244.
136. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004) (“As the English authorities
above reveal, the common law in 1791 conditioned admissibility of an absent witness’s
examination on unavailability and a prior opportunity to cross-examine. The Sixth Amendment
therefore incorporates those limitations.”); id. at 54 n.5 (refusing to consider a source cited in
the concurring opinion because it “was decided a half century earlier and cannot be taken as an
accurate statement of the law in 1791 . . . .”); id. at 58 n.8 (“It is questionable whether
testimonial statements would ever have been admissible on that ground in 1791 . . . .”); Giles
v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2682–85 (2008).
137. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53–54. The only other instances identified by the Crawford
court in which testimonial statements of an absent declarant are admissible are dying
declarations and when the defendant forfeits by wrongdoing his right to object on
Confrontation Clause grounds. Id. at 56 n.6, 62; accord Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2682–83.
138. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43–44 (citing 1 & 2 Phil. & M., c. 13 (1554), 2 & 3 Phil. &
M., c. 10 (1555)).
139. Neither the committal statute nor the bail statute used the word “witnesses,” but
instead referred to those that “bring” the suspect to the Justice of the Peace, but it was
common at the time for the arresting officer to be accompanied by complainants or witnesses,
and in some instances, citizens themselves participated in the act of arresting suspects and
bringing them to the Justice of the Peace. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN, PROSECUTING CRIME IN
THE RENAISSANCE: ENGLAND, GERMANY, FRANCE 11–12 (1974). The Acts did not require
the Justice of the Peace to seek out and examine other witnesses of likely importance, although
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felony or manslaughter cases, to record in writing any material
statements made by the suspect or witnesses within two days of the
examination, and to certify the same to the Assizes court, where the
trial itself would take place.140 In addition, the committal statute
obligated Justices of the Peace to bind material witnesses to testify at
trial.141 The Marian bail statute required, in relevant part, that when
a coroner’s jury returned a verdict of murder, manslaughter, or
accessory to the same, the coroner was to record in writing any
material evidence given before the jury, to certify the same to the
Assizes court, and to bind material witnesses to testify at trial.142
Although the original purpose of the Marian bail and committal
statutes was not to produce evidence admissible at trial, they came to
be used for that purpose.143 Yet by 1791, when the Sixth
Amendment was ratified, the use of evidence collected by Justices of
the Peace pursuant to the Marian committal statute was admissible
only if the witness was unavailable to testify,144 and their testimony
before the Justice of the Peace was subject to cross-examination by
the defendant.145 The Crawford Court cited this historical practice
under the Marian committal statute in support of its conclusion that,
subject only to the exceptions for dying declarations and forfeiture
by wrongdoing, the Sixth Amendment prohibits the admission of
testimonial hearsay statements of an absent declarant unless he is
unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to crossexamine him.146
Because of the Crawford Court’s focus on English practice in
general and practice under the Marian committal statute in
particular, it would be important to know how the testimony of a
witness examined by a Justice of the Peace under the Marian
committal statute was admitted at a subsequent trial in which the
witness was unavailable to testify. If a written record sufficed to
in practice, Justices of the Peace did treat the statutes as though the word “witnesses” had
been used. See id. at 12, 17 & n.31.
140. 2 & 3 Phil. & M., c. 10 (1555); see LANGBEIN, supra note 139, at 105–106.
141. 2 & 3 Phil. & M., c. 10 (1555).
142. 1 & 2 Phil. & M., c. 13 (1554). The bail statute also addressed imposed duties
upon Justices of the Peace related to the granting of bail.
143. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44.
144. Id. at 45 (citing Lord Morley’s Case, 6 How. St. Tr. 769, 770–71 (H.L. 1666)).
145. See id. at 46–47 (citing King v. Dingler, 168 Eng. Rep. 383, 383–84 (1791); King
v. Woodcock, 168 Eng. Rep. 352, 353 (1789)).
146. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53–56 & n.5.
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prove what the witnesses had said when offered in the Assizes court,
that would suggest that the historical exception for prior crossexamined testimony of an unavailable witness dispenses with any
right to confront the person who created a written record of the
witness’s testimony. If, on the other hand, the Justice of the Peace
had to appear at trial and testify to what the unavailable witness had
said (or at least be available to be cross-examined regarding the
same), that would suggest that the exception excused only the
witness’s absence. That witness’s testimony would then be proven by
the testimony of someone who had witnessed it and could be
confronted as to his recollection of what he allegedly heard the
witness testify.
An examination of historical sources, including both English
judicial decisions and secondary sources, confirms that, in those
instances in which testimony before a Justice of the Peace was
admitted at trial due to the witness’s unavailability, it was always the
case that the Justice of the Peace or someone else present at the
initial examination appeared at trial and swore to the accuracy of the
written record of the witness’s testimony.147
Thus, for example, in Lord Morley’s Case (cited in Crawford for
the proposition that former cross-examined testimony was admissible
only if the declarant was unavailable, therein defined as being “dead,
or unable to travel”), the court held that the prior testimony, given
before a coroner, was admissible only if “the coroner first ma[de]
oath that such examinations are the same which he took upon oath,
without any addition or alteration whatsoever.”148
Numerous secondary sources confirm the practice under the
Marian bail and committal statutes of requiring the Justice of the
Peace or other person present at the initial examination to appear
before the Assizes court to confirm under oath the accuracy of the
written record of the witness’s testimony.
For example, William Hawkins, in his Treatise on Pleas of the
Crown published in 1788, wrote as follows:
147. See Lord Morley’s Case, 6 How. St. Tr. 769, 770 (H.L. 1666); 2 WILLIAM
HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 605 ch. 46, § 6 (1787); 2 MATTHEW
HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 283 (1736); J.S. COCKBURN, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH ASSIZES 102–03 (1972) (citing WILLIAM LAMBARDE, WILLIAM LAMBARDE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT: HIS EPHEMERIS AND TWENTY-NINE CHARGES TO JURIES AND
COMMISSIONS 23, 25 (Conyers Read ed., 1962)); LANGBEIN, supra note 139, at 22–25; 5
WIGMORE, supra note 53, § 1667, at 780.
148. Lord Morley’s Case, 6 How. St. Tr. at 770.
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It seems settled, that the Examination of an Informer taken upon
Oath, and subscribed by him either before a Coroner upon an
Inquisition of Death in pursuance of 1 & 2 Ph. & M. 13149 or
before Justices of Peace in Pursuance of 1 & 2 Ph. & M. 13. and 2
& 3 Ph. & M. 10.150 upon a Bailment or Commitment for any
Felony, may be given in Evidence at the Trial of such Inquisition,
or of an Indictment for the same Felony, if it be made out by Oath
to the Satisfaction of the Court, that such Informer is dead, or
unable to Travel, or kept away by the Means or Procurement of the
Prisoner, and that the Examination offered in Evidence is the very
same that was sworn before the Coroner or Justice, without any
Alteration whatsoever.151

Likewise, Matthew Hale, in his History of the Pleas of the
Crown published in 1736, wrote:
By the statute 1 & 2 P. & M. cap. 13. and 2 & 3 P. & M. cap. 10.
Justices of peace and coroners have power to take examinations of
the party accused, and informations of the accusers and witnesses,
(the examinations to be without oath, the informations to be upon
oath,) and are to put the same in writing, and are to certify the
same to the next gaol-delivery.152
These examinations and informations thus taken and returned may
be read in evidence against the prisoner, if the informer be dead, or
so sick, that he is not able to travel, and oath thereof made;
otherwise not.
But then, 1. Oath must be made either by the justice or coroner, that
took them, or the clerk that wrote them, that they are the true
substance of what the informer gave in upon oath, and what the
prisoner confessed upon his examination.153

149. This is a reference to the Marian bail statute.
150. This is a reference to the Marian committal statute.
151. HAWKINS, supra note 147, at ch. 46, § 6 (emphasis added).
152. The phrase “gaol-delivery” refers to one of five commissions typically issued to the
assize judges for their semiannual circuits. LANGBEIN, supra note 139, at 10.
153. HALE, supra note 147, at 283 (emphasis added); see also id. at 51 (“By the statute of
1 & 2 Ph. & Mar. cap. 13. They ought to take the examinations of felons (without oath,) and
the information of accusers or witnesses (upon oath,) and return them to the justices of gaoldelivery. And these examinations may be read as evidence against the prisoner, and so may the
informations of witnesses taken upon oath, if they are dead or not able to travel, for they are
judges of record, and the statute enables and requires them to take these examinations; but
then oath is to be made in court by the justice or his clerk, that these examinations and
informations were truly taken.”); 1 MATTHEW HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN
586 (1736) (“[The justice of the peace] must take information of the prosecutor or witnesses
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Cockburn, in his History of English Assizes, confirms the
practice of requiring the Justice of the Peace to appear at Assizes:
After examination local magistrates were supposed to bind over
suspects to quarter sessions or assizes or to commit them to gaol to
await trial. Recognizances for appearance were also taken from
prosecutors and witnesses, and the examining magistrate himself
attended the subsequent trial to certify pertinent evidence and
supporting documentation.154

One might fairly ask what the purpose was of the Justice of the
Peace creating the written record if it was not admissible on its own
to prove the witness’s prior testimony. John Langbein, a historian
whose work is cited by the Supreme Court in nearly all of its recent
Confrontation Clause decisions,155 has written that the purpose of
the Marian bail and committal statutes was not to create a system of
written evidence, in which the Justice of the Peace’s written record
of what the witnesses said was used as evidence against the
accused.156 Rather, according to Langbein, the purpose of the
written record appears to have been primarily to refresh the memory
of the Justice of the Peace when he testified at trial about what he
heard the absent witnesses testify to.157 In the words of Langbein:
[T]he examination document was principally intended to buttress
the oral performance of the JP at trial. The examination record was
to be a sort of file memorandum for the JP—a prompter, like the
notes a modern policeman uses to refresh his memory.158

in writing upon oath, and return or certify them at the next sessions or gaol-delivery, and these
being upon the trial sworn to be truly taken by the justice or his clerk, & c. may be given in
evidence against the prisoner, if the witnesses be dead or not able to travel.”); STARKIE, 2 LAW
OF EVIDENCE Part IV, at 486 (1824) (“To warrant such evidence, it is essential to prove by
the justice, coroner, or his clerk, & c. that the depositions contain the substance of the
information on oath.”); Thomas Y. Davies, What Did the Framers Know, and When Did They
Know It? Fictional Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 105, 130–32
& n.83 (2005) (citing Hale).
154. COCKBURN, supra note 147, at 102–03 (citing WILLIAM LAMBARDE, WILLIAM
LAMBARDE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT: HIS EPHEMERIS AND TWENTY-NINE CHARGES TO
JURIES AND COMMISSIONS 23, 25 (Conyers Read ed., 1962)) (emphasis added).
155. See Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2683 (2008); Davis v. Washington, 547
U.S. 813, 830 n.5 (2006); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 44, 53 (2004).
156. LANGBEIN, supra note 139, at 22–24.
157. See id. at 31.
158. Id. at 35.
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Langbein’s explanation is corroborated by Wigmore, who wrote
that, at least through the 1800s, it was “necessary to call the
magistrate or the clerk, who verified the notes and thus used them as
an aid to memory.”159
In addition to these sources dealing directly with the Marian bail
and committal statutes, English precedents around and after the
ratification of the Sixth Amendment apply the same principle in
other instances in which an effort is made to prove former testimony.
For example, in Mayor of Doncaster v. Day,160 the court held that:
what a witness, since dead, has sworn upon a trial between the
same parties, may . . . be given in evidence, either from the Judge’s
notes, or from notes that have been taken by any other person,
who will swear to their accuracy; or the former evidence may be
proved by any person who will swear from his memory to its having
been given.161

With respect to the use of the Judge’s own notes, Greenleaf
explained that this was so only in a “case of necessity,” and only in
the instance in which “both actions are tried before the same
Judge.”162 Thus, in every instance recognized for proving former
testimony at common law, the accused had some way of confronting
the witness to the former testimony. If a witness was testifying based
on his memory, he was required to appear at trial and swear to its
accuracy. Similarly, notes taken by any person could be offered to
prove the former testimony, but only if the person appeared at trial
and swore to their accuracy. And, finally, the judge’s own notes
could be used in a case of necessity, but because this practice was
limited to situations in which the same judge tried both actions, by
necessity, the accused had the ability to confront the witness (here
the judge) who created those notes.

159. See WIGMORE, supra note 53, § 1667, at 780 (citing Lord Morley’s Trial, 6 How.
St. Tr. 770 (1666); Wakeman’s Trial, 7 How. St. Tr. 591, 654 (1679); Earl of Stafford’s Trial,
7 How. St. Tr. 1293 (1680); R. v. Howe, 1 Camp.462 (1808); R. v. Watkins, 4 Car. & P. 550
(1831)).
160. 128 Eng. Rep. 104 (1810).
161. Id.; accord 1 STARKIE ON EVIDENCE Sect. CVII, at 280 n.m (1830) (“The evidence
of a witness upon the former trial may be proved either by the Judge’s notes, or on oath, by
the notes or recollection of any person who heard it.”).
162. 1 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 166, at 215 (4th
ed. 1848) (emphasis added).
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Accordingly, practice in England under the Marian bail and
committal statutes as well as practice in England generally at the time
the Sixth Amendment was ratified was consistent with early practice
in the United States through the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries: notes could be used to refresh the court reporter’s (or
Justice of the Peace’s) memory, or could be admitted if she appeared
at trial and testified to a lack of memory but swore that the notes
were accurate when taken, but they could not be admitted without
the court reporter or Justice of the Peace’s personal appearance at
trial. In all instances, the accused had the ability, in some way, to
confront the person who created the written memorialization of
former testimony being offered against him.
IV. PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THE HIDDEN
DECLARANT PROBLEM
The clear command of Crawford, as enunciated in MelendezDiaz, when coupled with the absence of any evidence of a historical
exception to the Confrontation right for transcripts or notes of
former testimony, compels a conclusion that it will at least in some
circumstances violate the Confrontation Clause for the prosecution
to offer evidence of former testimony against the accused by means
of a transcript or stenographic notes. This is true even if the evidence
otherwise satisfies Crawford in that the person who gave the former
testimony is now unavailable and the accused had an opportunity to
cross-examine her. Thus, as a general matter, such transcripts or
notes can be offered into evidence against the accused only if the
prosecution calls the court reporter or stenographer as a witness at
trial, thereby making them available to the accused to cross-examine.
To be sure, such an interpretation of the Confrontation Clause
raises significant practical concerns for prosecutors, who would now
be forced to call court reporters as witnesses whenever they seek to
admit former testimony into evidence. Not only is this burdensome,
but if the court reporter is dead or otherwise unavailable, such a rule
may make it impossible to prove the former testimony, at least in the
absence of other evidence of the former testimony, such as testimony
by a person who was present at the earlier trial. Yet these practical
concerns are no different in kind from those expressed by the dissent
in Melendez-Diaz:
[T]he Court threatens to disrupt forensic investigations across the
country and to put prosecutions nationwide at risk of dismissal
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based on erratic, all-too-frequent instances when a particular
laboratory technician, now invested by the Court’s new
constitutional designation as the analyst, simply does not or cannot
appear.163

In response, the majority indicated that the Court “may not
disregard [the Confrontation Clause] at [its] convenience” to
accommodate practical concerns.164
As Melendez-Diaz holds, the Confrontation Clause cannot be
ignored because it is inconvenient. I therefore propose four practical
solutions that satisfy the Confrontation Clause while at the same
time reducing the need to call court reporters as witnesses.
The first of these proposals was suggested by the Court in
Melendez-Diaz. There, the Court indicated that one way states and
the federal government could in many cases avoid the inconvenience
of always being required to call the forensic analysts as witnesses was
to enact so-called “notice-and-demand statutes.”165 The MelendezDiaz Court approved, in dicta, of what it described as the “simplest
form” of such statutes, which “require the prosecution to provide
notice to the defendant of its intent to use an analyst’s report as
evidence at trial, after which the defendant is given a period of time
in which he may object to the admission of the evidence absent the
analyst’s appearance live at trial.”166 Accordingly, in a like vein, after
Melendez-Diaz, states could enact notice-and-demand statutes for
transcripts of former testimony, requiring the accused to demand the
presence of the court reporter by a particular point in time or waive
the right to complain on Confrontation Clause grounds.
My second proposal involves eliminating the layered hearsay and
Confrontation Clause problem altogether by having the witness
adopt the transcript as his testimony by reading it over and signing

163. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2549 (2009) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
164. Id. at 2540.
165. Id. at 2541.
166. Id. Subsequent lower court decisions have relied on this language to uphold the
constitutionality of state notice-and-demand statutes. E.g., State v. Steele, 689 S.E.2d 155,
161 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010); State v. Murphy, 219 P.3d 1223, 1229–30 (Kan. Ct. App. 2009).
The Court left open the question of whether statutes that impose a more onerous burden on
the accused—such as those that “requir[e] defense counsel to subpoena the analyst, to show
good cause for demanding the analyst’s presence, or even to affirm under oath an intent to
cross-examine the analyst”—would pass constitutional muster. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at
2541 n.12.
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it. Under this approach, as Wigmore explains, any objection to not
calling the court reporter or other official who made the transcript or
report of the witness’s testimony disappears:
If the report is signed by the witness or the accused . . . then it has
become by adoption his own statement, and it is no longer merely
the magistrate’s report of what was testified; consequently, it may
be put in as the witness’ or accused’s own statement, if his
signature to it as read to him is proved . . . . It follows, when the
document is used in this way, that the objection as to not calling
the magistrate or his clerk disappears, since it is not put in as the
officer’s report.167

Indeed, some early U.S. case law holds that when so read over
and signed, the document itself becomes the witness’s testimony (as
contrasted with their oral testimony). Thus, under the best evidence
rule, the read over and signed document becomes the best evidence
of the witness’s former testimony, barring even testimony by others
who witnessed him testify orally.168
Moreover, a number of late nineteenth century decisions that
deemed stenographer’s notes (in the absence of the stenographer)
inadmissible to prove a witness’s former testimony contrast the use
of the stenographer’s notes with the use of a transcript of testimony
that is read over and signed by the witness.169 Such a procedure,
while not used with great frequency today, still exists in some
jurisdictions.170 Under this proposal, one would treat the read over
and signed document as the witness’s former testimony, and the
same constitutional principles excusing the witness’s failure to appear
at the present trial to testify likewise should excuse his read over and
adopted transcript of his prior testimony.
My third proposal likewise eliminates the layered hearsay and
Confrontation Clause problems. Under this proposal, if the accused
somehow adopted the transcript of the former testimony—either
167. See WIGMORE, supra note 53, § 1667, at 782.
168. See Matthews v. State, 11 So. 203, 203–04 (Ala. 1892); Kain v. Larkin, 30 N.E.
105, 108 (N.Y. 1892).
169. See Garazewski v. Wurm, 169 N.W. 871, 873 (Mich. 1918); Toohey v. Plummer,
37 N.W. 297, 299–300 (Mich. 1888); State v. Maynard, 113 S.E. 682, 684 (N.C. 1922);
Smith v. Moore, 62 S.E. 892, 896 (N.C. 1908).
170. See, e.g., Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure 30(E)(1) (“When the testimony is fully
transcribed, the deposition shall be submitted to the witness for reading and signing and shall
be read to or by him, unless such reading and signing have been waived by the witness and by
each party.”).
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expressly by, say, signing something indicating that it was a complete
and accurate record of the witness’s testimony, or implicitly, say by
submitting it as part of the record on appeal of the earlier trial—the
transcript would then become the accused’s own statement of what
the former testimony was. The transcript would then qualify as a
non-hearsay admission of a party-opponent,171 eliminating the outer
layer Confrontation Clause problem, since the Clause does not
provide the accused with a right to confront himself.172
My final proposal is to regularly audiotape or videotape
testimony (as is done in some jurisdictions today),173 and to offer
into evidence that recording of the former testimony in lieu of a
transcript of the same. This would eliminate a layer of hearsay,
because machines, such as video or tape recorders do not count as
“declarants” under the hearsay rule, which refers only to statements
made by people:
Hear-say is understood to be “a statement, other than one made by
the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Fed.R.Evid.
801(c) (emphasis added). “A declarant is a person who makes a
statement.” Fed.R.Evid. 801(b) (emphasis added). And a
“statement,” to repeat, is an “(1) oral or written assertion or (2)
nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an
assertion.” Fed.R.Evid. 801(a) (emphasis added). Only a person
may be a declarant and make a statement. Accordingly, “nothing
‘said’ by a machine . . . is hear-say.”174

This is consistent with the policies underlying the hearsay rule,
since the hearsay risks associated with statements made by people,
such as court reporters, do not apply to statements made by
machines:

171. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B) (“A statement is not hearsay if . . . [t]he statement
is offered against a party and is . . . (B) a statement of which the party has manifested an
adoption or belief in its truth . . . .”).
172. See United States v. Nazemian, 948 F.2d 522, 525–26 (9th Cir. 1991); State v.
Konohia, 107 P.3d 1190, 1199 n.11 (Haw. Ct. App. 2005); Johnson v. State, 832 N.E.2d
985, 999 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); State v. Torres, 121 P.3d 429, 438 (Kan. 2005).
173. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 38, § 8:117; Gorgos, supra note 47, at
1057; Georgi-Ann Oshagan, Videotaped Trial Transcripts and Appellate Review: Are Some
Courts Favoring Form Over Substance?, 38 WAYNE L. REV. 1639 (1992).
174. United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225, 231 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting 4
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER AND LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE, § 380, at 65
(2d ed. 1994)).
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[I]t is axiomatic that an out-of-court statement must be made by a
person or writing, not by an object such as a video camera. Hearsay
evidence is inadmissible because it relies upon the credibility of
someone other than the witness. In other words, hearsay evidence
is considered untrustworthy because the declarant is not subject to
cross-examination . . . . In the context of hearsay evidence,
however, credibility and trustworthiness are characteristics peculiar
to people or documents written or generated by people. Objects
such as a video camera neither have nor lack credibility or
trustworthiness. If properly operated, there is no reason to suspect
that images received from a video camera and displayed on a video
monitor are unreliable. As such, the underlying basis for excluding
hearsay evidence does not apply to “out-of-court statements” made
by a video camera.175

For like reasons, “statements” made by machines are not subject
to Confrontation Clause analysis:
Nor is a machine a “witness against” anyone. If the readings are
“statements” by a “witness against” the defendants, then the
machine must be the declarant. Yet how could one cross-examine a
gas chromatograph? Producing spectrographs, ovens, and
centrifuges in court would serve no one’s interests.176

To be sure, these proposals will not eliminate all situations in
which it will be necessary to call a court reporter to testify to the
content of a witness’s former testimony. Collectively, however, they
will reduce the number of instances in which it is necessary and thus
the burden that such an interpretation of the Confrontation Clause
will have on prosecutors.
V. CONCLUSION
Not only do transcripts of former testimony present an
interesting layered hearsay problem that has all the makings of a
classic law school hypothetical, but, after Crawford and MelendezDiaz, it is clear that they present a serious Confrontation Clause
problem as well. Crawford’s historical exception to the command of
the Confrontation Clause for former testimony of an unavailable
declarant that the accused had an opportunity to cross-examine

175. People v. Tharpe-Williams, 676 N.E.2d 717, 720 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (citations
omitted).
176. United States v. Moon, 512 F.3d 359, 362 (7th Cir. 2008).
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extends only to the former testimony itself, not to transcripts or
other written memorializations of the testimony or to hearsay
statements by other persons contained within the former testimony.
In such triple-layered hearsay scenarios, whether the innermost
layer (hearsay statements by third persons) presents a Confrontation
Clause problem depends on whether the particular statement at issue
is testimonial or not, and, if so, whether it falls within an exception
to Crawford. Yet, so far as the outermost layer (the transcript itself)
is concerned, this Article has shown that—at least in some
circumstances—it is clearly a testimonial statement by the court
reporter within the meaning of Crawford and its progeny and that it
does not fall within any historical exception to Crawford.
Accordingly, absent legislative reform or changes to the way in which
former testimony is memorialized, Crawford compels the court
reporter to appear at trial and be subject to cross-examination by the
accused if her transcript or stenographic notes are to be offered into
evidence against the accused to prove an unavailable witness’s former
testimony.
Four different reforms are possible that would reduce the
number of instances in which production of the court reporter is
necessary. The first involves the expansion of notice-and-demand
statutes to cover court reporters, requiring that the accused demand
production of the court reporter by a certain date or waive her right
to complain of the court reporter’s absence on Confrontation Clause
grounds.
The other three all involve, in one way or another, eliminating
the outermost layer of hearsay creating the Confrontation Clause
problem. The first involves establishing procedures whereby
witnesses read over and sign transcripts of their testimony, thus
adopting the transcript as their testimony, resulting in a single
declarant—the witness—whose presence is already excused for the
reasons permitting his former testimony to be admitted in the first
instance. The second involves establishing procedures whereby the
accused reads over and signs transcript of witness testimony in the
initial proceedings, thereby converting the transcript into a nonhearsay adoptive admission by the accused, thus eliminating any
Confrontation Clause claim given that the Clause does not give the
accused a right to confront himself. The final reform involves
eliminating human involvement in the process of memorializing
former witness testimony through the use of video or audio
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recording of witness testimony, as the Confrontation Clause
encompasses only statements by people.
While these reforms will not in all instances eliminate the
inconvenience of producing court reporters at trial, it must be
remembered that the Confrontation Clause (like the other rights
guaranteed to the accused in the Bill of Rights) is not designed to
ensure efficient resolution of criminal trials. Rather, the Clause
protects the accused against the risk of wrongful prosecution by
giving him the right to test the reliability of evidence offered against
him through the direct confrontation of those who testify, either
orally or in writing, against him.
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